View Full Version : Does anyone use disk drive encryption?
OpenRoad
04-21-2010, 08:50 PM
I have never used drive encryption but since I have tax info and other such stuff on my computers, I figured I had better protect it. "Whole drive encryption" is what I was thinking of. Not sure if there is a good public domain (free) thing out there that works....
kllian
04-21-2010, 08:51 PM
two options.
truecrypt creates a file that you can store information in or you can use it to encrypt your entire hard drive.
what I prefer is an open source piece of software called axcrypt that allows you to encrypt files or folders using the same password. i use it daily and have had no issues.
i encrypt all my tax info, then store that info in dropbox so it's backed up.
The Chariot
04-21-2010, 09:06 PM
I've used Truecrypt for years. It kicks ass. I keep personal information and passwords in a container file which mounts as a drive letter. When I go on road trips I encrypt the entire drive.
Obsidian
04-21-2010, 09:38 PM
I have been using TrueCrypt (http://truecrypt.org)for many years as well. I use encrypted file containers, encrypted external disk drives and I encrypt my entire OS with it as well.
OpenRoad
04-21-2010, 11:04 PM
I have been using TrueCrypt (http://truecrypt.org)for many years as well. I use encrypted file containers, encrypted external disk drives and I encrypt my entire OS with it as well.
Sounds like the way to go... thanks
Cauhauna
04-22-2010, 08:57 AM
I also use TrueCrypt.
It is very handy, espeically if you like having the exact same thing on multiple machines. I have a 4GB file encrypted that mounts as its own drive letter, as others have mentioned. You can copy this file around to all of your machines and have all of your data on all machines
swarga
04-22-2010, 09:25 AM
Where do you guys keep your encryption keys?
The Chariot
04-22-2010, 10:16 AM
Where do you guys keep your encryption keys?
Truecrypt gives you the option of either using a encryption keyfiles or a typed password. I use a 24 digit typed password for most things. Really don't have anything requiring more than that for my uses. On occasion I have used keyfiles... I store them on a thumb drive inside of a password protected Truecrypt volume.
PGP has a program similar to Truecrypt, I used that for years (paid) until Truecrypt came along and it beats the pants off of every paid program I've seen. Best part is you can even create hidden volumes in drive free space.
TechnologiQ
05-18-2010, 12:36 AM
Using bit locker for my windows 7 pc with true crypt for portable containers. its truecrypt only for my macs. The ability to use hidden containers is great too!
MadHatter
05-18-2010, 04:15 AM
I've used PGP for years, starting with the DOS version (remember DOS? Had a pet dinosaur back then...). It seemed to be mighty good for a long time. Used encrypted "virtual disks", encrypted partitions, and encrypted whole disks. They were pretty reliable, until recently...
...when I lost several entire USB external disks that I had encrypted with PGP. They would connect with WinXP (SP3) when I plugged them in, but the password box wouldn't come up. Windows just sees them as an unformatted disk. PGP's forums and help desks don't have a clue what's going on. Apparently it's been happening for years, a "quiet epidemic" that they don't talk about much. So much for customer support.
Coincidentally, this happened last weekend, when I tried encrypting a 500gb external drive, thinking the most recent version (10.0) might work better. Completed successfully, but when I disconnected and then reconnected the drive, it wasn't recognized.
So it's goodbye to PGP. Thanks to the folks above for your recommendations.
I'll be looking into TrueCrypt. Have any of you had problems with it? Is it reliable, quick, etc.?
MH
The Chariot
05-18-2010, 04:19 AM
I used PGP for years. Went to Truecrypt and never looked back. Faster, better and rock solid.
Davis
05-18-2010, 05:37 PM
I just started using TrueCrypt recently and have been extremly happy with it so far.
<<JAZZY>>
05-27-2010, 01:02 PM
TrueCrypt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Security concerns:
TrueCrypt is vulnerable to various attacks. To prevent certain types of attack, the TrueCrypt website recommends users follow various security precautions[8] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-7).
Listed below are known security concerns pertaining to TrueCrypt and, where possible, some ways to avoid them.
Plausible deniability
TrueCrypt's hidden volume deniability features may be unintentionally compromised by third party software which may leak information through temporary files, thumbnails, etc, to unencrypted disks. In a recent study, Windows Vista (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Windows_Vista), Microsoft Word (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Microsoft_Word) and Google Desktop (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Google_Desktop) were evaluated and found to store information on unencrypted disks. In response to this, the study suggested using hidden operating system feature functionality, now available in TrueCrypt versions 6.0 and later (TrueCrypt will then make local unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes read-only to prevent data leaks)[9] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-8). The security of TrueCrypt's implementation of this feature was not evaluated because the first version of TrueCrypt with this option had only recently been released.[10] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-9)
Identifying TrueCrypt volumes
TrueCrypt volumes do not contain known file headers and their content is indistinguishable from random data, so while it is theoretically impossible to prove that certain files are TrueCrypt volumes, their presence can provide reasonable suspicion (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Reasonable_suspicion) (probable cause (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Probable_cause))[11] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-10) that they contain encrypted data. TrueCrypt volume files have file sizes that are evenly divisible by 512 and their content passes chi-square (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Chi-square) randomness tests. These features give reason to suspect a file to be a TrueCrypt volume[12] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-11).
Passwords stored in memory
TrueCrypt stores its keys in RAM; on an ordinary personal computer the DRAM will maintain its contents for several seconds after power is cut (or longer if the temperature is lowered). Even if there is some degradation in the memory contents, various algorithms can intelligently recover the keys. This method (which would apply in particular to a notebook computer stolen while in power-on, suspended, or screen-locked mode) has been successfully used to attack a file system protected by TrueCrypt.[13] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-12)
The "Stoned" bootkit
The "Stoned" (http://www.stoned-vienna.com) bootkit (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Bootkit), a MBR (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Master_Boot_Record) rootkit (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Rootkit) presented by Austrian software developer Peter Kleissner (http://www.peterkleissner.com) at the Black Hat (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Black_Hat_Briefings)[1] (http://www.blackhat.com) Technical Security Conference USA 2009[14] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-13)[15] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-14), has been shown capable of tampering Truecrypt's MBR effectively bypassing Truecrypt's full volume encryption (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Full_disk_encryption).[16] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-15)[17] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-16) (but potentially every hard disk (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Hard_disk_drive) encryption software is affected too if it does not rely on hardware-based encryption technologies like TPM (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module), or—even if it does—if this type of attack is made with administrative privileges while the encrypted operating system is running[18] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-17)[19] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-18)).
Two types of attack scenarios exist in which it is possible to maliciously take advantage of this bootkit, currently written for Win32 platforms only: in the first one, the user is required to launch (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Execution_(computing)) the bootkit with administrative privileges once the PC has already booted (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Booting) into Windows; in the second one, analogously to hardware keyloggers (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Hardware_keylogger), a malicious person needs physical access to the user's Truecrypt-encrypted hard disk: in this context this is needed to modify the user's Truecrypt MBR with the Stoned's one and then place the hard disk back on the unknowing user's PC, so that when the user boots the PC and types his/her Truecrypt password on boot, the "Stoned" bootkit intercepts it thereafter because, from that moment on, the Stoned bootkit is loaded before Truecrypt's MBR in the boot sequence. The first type of attack can be prevented as usual by good security practices, i.e. avoid running non-trusted executables (http://www.radardetector.net/wiki/Executable) with administrative privileges; the second one can be successfully neutralized—by the side of a user who suspect his/her encrypted hard disk might have been physically available to someone he/she doesn't trust—by booting the encrypted operating system with Truecrypt's Rescue Disk instead of booting it directly from the hard disk and restoring boot loader in MBR.[20] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-19)
Removal of source
Only the most recent version of the TrueCrypt source is made available[21] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-20), with the source code for all previous versions being publicly removed[22] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-21) after each release is made, thus preventing comparison with earlier versions.
Obsidian
06-26-2010, 04:48 PM
If the FBI can't break it, then it's good enough for me. They fact that their efforts focused on a dictionary attack against the password says they have no hope of breaking the actual encryption algorithm.
G1 - Not even FBI was able to decrypt files of Daniel Dantas - notícias em English (http://g1.globo.com/English/noticia/2010/06/not-even-fbi-can-de-crypt-files-daniel-dantas.html)
The FBI failed to break the encryption code of hard drives seized by federal police at the apartment of banker Daniel Dantas, in Rio de Janeiro, during Operation Satyagraha. The operation began in July 2008. According to a report published on Friday (25) by the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, after a year of unsuccessful attempts, the U.S. federal police returned the equipment to Brazil in April.
According to the report, the fed only requested help from USA in early 2009, after experts from the National Institute of Criminology (INC) failed to decode the passwords on the hard drives. The government has no legal instrument to compel the manufacturer of the American encryption system or Dantas to give the access codes.
The equipment will remain under the protection of the feds. INC expect that new research data or technology could help them break the security codes. Opportunity Group reported that the two programs used in the equipment are available online. One is called Truecrypt and is free. The programs were used due to suspected espionage.
According to the report, the FBI and the INC used the same technology to try to break the password. It is a mechanism called a "dictionary" - a computer system that tests password combinations from known data and police information. Experts from the INC used this technique for five months, until December 2008, when the discs were sent to the United States.
MadHatter
06-27-2010, 05:56 PM
TrueCrypt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt)
Security concerns:
TrueCrypt is vulnerable to various attacks. To prevent certain types of attack, the TrueCrypt website recommends users follow various security precautions[8] (http://www.radardetector.net/forums/#cite_note-7).
Listed below are known security concerns pertaining to TrueCrypt and, where possible, some ways to avoid them.
Plausible deniability
Identifying TrueCrypt volumes
Passwords stored in memory
The "Stoned" bootkit
Removal of source
Actually, I believe that all encryption systems are vulnerable to the forms of attack mentioned above. We still have to be alert and aware, just as we are with our radar/laser CMs. Can't just "plug it in and ignore it", so to speak.
I'm gradually switching over to TrueCrypt, having lost faith in PGP over many years of small (but irritating) problems, followed by the larger ones I mentioned in a post above.
MH