I used PGP for years. Went to Truecrypt and never looked back. Faster, better and rock solid.
I used PGP for years. Went to Truecrypt and never looked back. Faster, better and rock solid.
I just started using TrueCrypt recently and have been extremly happy with it so far.
[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt"]TrueCrypt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]
Security concerns:
TrueCrypt is vulnerable to various attacks. To prevent certain types of attack, the TrueCrypt website recommends users follow various security precautions[8].
Listed below are known security concerns pertaining to TrueCrypt and, where possible, some ways to avoid them.
Plausible deniability
TrueCrypt's hidden volume deniability features may be unintentionally compromised by third party software which may leak information through temporary files, thumbnails, etc, to unencrypted disks. In a recent study, Windows Vista, Microsoft Word and Google Desktop were evaluated and found to store information on unencrypted disks. In response to this, the study suggested using hidden operating system feature functionality, now available in TrueCrypt versions 6.0 and later (TrueCrypt will then make local unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes read-only to prevent data leaks)[9]. The security of TrueCrypt's implementation of this feature was not evaluated because the first version of TrueCrypt with this option had only recently been released.[10]
Identifying TrueCrypt volumes
TrueCrypt volumes do not contain known file headers and their content is indistinguishable from random data, so while it is theoretically impossible to prove that certain files are TrueCrypt volumes, their presence can provide reasonable suspicion (probable cause)[11] that they contain encrypted data. TrueCrypt volume files have file sizes that are evenly divisible by 512 and their content passes chi-square randomness tests. These features give reason to suspect a file to be a TrueCrypt volume[12].
Passwords stored in memory
TrueCrypt stores its keys in RAM; on an ordinary personal computer the DRAM will maintain its contents for several seconds after power is cut (or longer if the temperature is lowered). Even if there is some degradation in the memory contents, various algorithms can intelligently recover the keys. This method (which would apply in particular to a notebook computer stolen while in power-on, suspended, or screen-locked mode) has been successfully used to attack a file system protected by TrueCrypt.[13]
The "Stoned" bootkit
The "Stoned" bootkit, a MBR rootkit presented by Austrian software developer Peter Kleissner at the Black Hat[1] Technical Security Conference USA 2009[14][15], has been shown capable of tampering Truecrypt's MBR effectively bypassing Truecrypt's full volume encryption.[16][17] (but potentially every hard disk encryption software is affected too if it does not rely on hardware-based encryption technologies like TPM, or—even if it does—if this type of attack is made with administrative privileges while the encrypted operating system is running[18][19]).
Two types of attack scenarios exist in which it is possible to maliciously take advantage of this bootkit, currently written for Win32 platforms only: in the first one, the user is required to launch the bootkit with administrative privileges once the PC has already booted into Windows; in the second one, analogously to hardware keyloggers, a malicious person needs physical access to the user's Truecrypt-encrypted hard disk: in this context this is needed to modify the user's Truecrypt MBR with the Stoned's one and then place the hard disk back on the unknowing user's PC, so that when the user boots the PC and types his/her Truecrypt password on boot, the "Stoned" bootkit intercepts it thereafter because, from that moment on, the Stoned bootkit is loaded before Truecrypt's MBR in the boot sequence. The first type of attack can be prevented as usual by good security practices, i.e. avoid running non-trusted executables with administrative privileges; the second one can be successfully neutralized—by the side of a user who suspect his/her encrypted hard disk might have been physically available to someone he/she doesn't trust—by booting the encrypted operating system with Truecrypt's Rescue Disk instead of booting it directly from the hard disk and restoring boot loader in MBR.[20]
Removal of source
Only the most recent version of the TrueCrypt source is made available[21], with the source code for all previous versions being publicly removed[22] after each release is made, thus preventing comparison with earlier versions.
If the FBI can't break it, then it's good enough for me. They fact that their efforts focused on a dictionary attack against the password says they have no hope of breaking the actual encryption algorithm.
G1 - Not even FBI was able to decrypt files of Daniel Dantas - notícias em English
The FBI failed to break the encryption code of hard drives seized by federal police at the apartment of banker Daniel Dantas, in Rio de Janeiro, during Operation Satyagraha. The operation began in July 2008. According to a report published on Friday (25) by the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, after a year of unsuccessful attempts, the U.S. federal police returned the equipment to Brazil in April.
According to the report, the fed only requested help from USA in early 2009, after experts from the National Institute of Criminology (INC) failed to decode the passwords on the hard drives. The government has no legal instrument to compel the manufacturer of the American encryption system or Dantas to give the access codes.
The equipment will remain under the protection of the feds. INC expect that new research data or technology could help them break the security codes. Opportunity Group reported that the two programs used in the equipment are available online. One is called Truecrypt and is free. The programs were used due to suspected espionage.
According to the report, the FBI and the INC used the same technology to try to break the password. It is a mechanism called a "dictionary" - a computer system that tests password combinations from known data and police information. Experts from the INC used this technique for five months, until December 2008, when the discs were sent to the United States.
Actually, I believe that all encryption systems are vulnerable to the forms of attack mentioned above. We still have to be alert and aware, just as we are with our radar/laser CMs. Can't just "plug it in and ignore it", so to speak.
I'm gradually switching over to TrueCrypt, having lost faith in PGP over many years of small (but irritating) problems, followed by the larger ones I mentioned in a post above.
MH
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